Franco-Prussian War 1870–1871, Volume 1: The Campaign of Sedan: Helmuth Von Moltke and the Overthrow of the Second Empire

The topic is quite interesting. Of note is that the same way 'Germany ' and France went to war in August 1870 greatly resembles how they went to war in August 1914.Per the Kindle Edition, the text is hard to follow because of the poor maps. They'd be fine in a full-size print edition, but in Kindle they are unreadable.Further, the Appendices are also useless, with headings jumbled single-column down the left margins.Still, much useful info for the $2.99 price.

After a brief examination of Moltke the Elder's military accomplishments up to 1866, the author takes a closer look at his role as the Chief of Staff of the Prussian and North German Federation actions against the Austrians and her allies in 1866. Then the scene shifts to the reorganization and build-up before the war against France. The operations of 1870 along the border, against the main French army that is finally bottled up in Metz, and against the Army of Chalons until its being trapped and surrendered at Sedan are very well described with well-done maps that help illustrate the maneuverings. The struggles Moltke the Elder had to contend with two of his army commanders and with the Prussian king are well covered. Both of these volumes are a must for anyone interested in the military operations in Europe between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of the Great War (WW1).

The Franco Prussian war and the capture of Alsace and Lorraine all but guaranteed a future struggle between Germany and France. This culminated in World War I. For those interested in the fall of Napoleon III and the French Empire, and the brilliance of Bismarck and the elder Moltke, I highly recommend this work, especially as there is quite a dearth of literature on the subject at hand. Dry at points, but books on war must have such attributes at times. A very good read.

This is a very detailed and well researched review of the Franco-Prussian war through the battle of Sedan. The book does an excellent job of following the military units up to the major battles and spends one chapter on each major battle with a couple of chapters on Sedan.The only issue that I have with the book is that the maps are next to useless. I found myself trying to following the military units using the maps and it was next to impossible. Instead, I used the book, the Battle of Sedan to help me in this effort.I don't recommend this book unless you are really interested, like I am, in this historical period and its impact on the future of Europe (which was major).

(Note: This review is for both Volumes 1 and 2 of Quintin Barry's "The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71").For any serious student of the Franco-Prussian War, this two-volume account by Quintin Barry would have to be considered "must reading". Barry offers up the most complete and comprehensive study of the war currently in print, even more detailed than Douglas Fermer's two books on the subject, "Sedan 1870" and "France At Bay". These books are not for the casual reader, however, or someone not already familiar with the Franco-Prussian War. For more introductory accounts, either Warwo's or Howard's works would be more appropriate. But for those who really want to submerge themselves in the war, right down to the "nuts and bolts", then I would highly recommend Barry's two-volume history.Barry has a very good writing style, which can usually overcome the sometimes very dry nature of the subject. As I mentioned, Barry's works are highly detailed, and give almost daily movements of French and especially German units, as well as clashes both large and small, for every campaign of the war. In fact, the level of such detail, especially in covering some of the lesser-known campaigns chronicled in Volume 2, can get a bit tedious. Thankfully Barry is skilled enough as a writer to enliven the subject wherever he can. Still, for all the detail, I wouldn't recommend Barry for those seeking alot of anecdotal information from the private soldier's point of view. Barry mostly confines himself to unit movement and action, and the thoughts and motivations of the commanding generals.It helps to have good maps handy to follow the movements that are so heavily detailed in these books. Sadly, the maps given are definitely the weakest point of these volumes -- they are small and smudgy, black & white only, and appear to be very old reprints. The units are statically indicated on them, and poorly marked out. And while some maps do indicate unit locations at different times/dates, it's really hard-sledding to follow the battles and make sense of them. Also, indicators of movement (such as arrows) are not used. The maps also tend to give too much information -- as far as irrelevant topographical features, such as marking out every stream, road, and tiny village, all of which tends to interfere with the necessary information they're trying to convey... these maps are simply too "busy". After getting used to full-color, topographical maps of, say, the Osprey Series (including excellent three-quarter views of battlefields), these maps hugely disappoint. I actually ended up following the text along on such superior maps as I could find in other books or off the internet, which helped me get the feel of the action being described. I would recommend any reader to do the same, instead of relying on the maps given! Barry does provide a wealth of drawings of the actions and portraits/photographs of the various participants.Both volumes are written definitely more from the German point of view than the French, but this fact is highlighted in the books' subtitle: "Helmuth von Moltke and the Overthrow of the Second Empire" and "Helmuth von Molkte and the Defeat of the Government of National Defense". Barry gives top priority to chronicling Moltke's plans, orders, and thoughts, which is actually very wise, because the war was so largely fought on Moltke's terms, not those of any other Germans, nor of their French adversaries. One might wish to have a bit more detailed information on French plans and movements, but due to the relative dearth of French manuscripts to draw on, compared to the vast storehouse of German works available, this is understandable. As the winners of the war, Germans were anxious to publish their accounts, including some very valuable and detailed journals of such participants as Generals Blumenthal, Verdy du Vernois, Waldersee, Stosch, the Crown Prince, Prince Frederick Wilhelm, Colonel Wartensleben, and of course, Helmuth Von Moltke himself.During the second volume, which chronicles the various thrusts and counter-thrusts of numerous armies around France, as well as the situation in besieged Paris, Barry does a good job of presenting a balanced account, shifting focus as necessary to the various theaters of the war. My only complaint about how the material is presented is in the first volume, where the critically important battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte-St Privat are each only given one thin chapter apiece, while the anti-climatic Battle of Sedan occupies five whole chapters! Sorry, but I've always regarded the lopsided German victory and French surrender at Sedan as the final and inevitable outcome of a horrible political policy forced upon Marshal MacMahon and his Army of Chalons. Once MacMahon accepted the suicidal course of action being demanded from Paris, it was a foregone conclusion that his army would be penned and defeated, as they were on September 1st.Yet the smaller scale Battle of Mars-la-Tour on August 16th offered Marshal Bazaine and his beleaguered Army of the Rhine it's best chance of defeating segments of the German army in detail and opening up the road west to Verdun, and hence to Chalons, where Bazaine could unite with MacMahon. The bigger Battle of Gravelotte-St Privat, fought two days later, still offered Bazaine some opportunities for victory and break-out towards his base to the west. It was also the biggest battle of the war by any measure, and had the largest strategic implications. Had the French gained a strategic victory at Gravelotte, then the whole course of the war would have been effected. As it was, the Germans' strategic victory insured that Bazaine and his army would be shut-up in the Metz fortifications until surrendered in late October.Tactically, the Battle of Gravelotte is, I believe, the most interesting of the war, and offers up so many possibilities and interpretations. While it showed Marshal Bazaine once again to be a timid and weak general, and certainly not up to field-army command, it's also one of the few battles that shows the vaulted German commanders, including Moltke, and the usually reliable staff-work of the army, in a relatively poor light. Gravelotte was hardly a "feather in the cap" for the Germans, and only the muddled and defensive-based thinking of Bazaine saved them from possible disaster, as they flung 4 complete corps haphazardly and with little coordination against immensely strong French defensive positions. Based on the results of the battle, which included the heaviest losses suffered by either side in any battle of the war -- 20,160 dead & wounded Germans (against only 7,855 French killed & wounded) it's difficult to award the tactical victory to the Germans. Their final assault at 8pm against the French extreme right-flank, while very successful, was far too late in the day to allow any follow-up, and the French were given the chance to staunch the rout of their 6th Corps, stabilize their lines for the night, then pull back into Metz the next morning. Sadly, I found Barry's account of this crucial battle to be very weak and cursory, especially when considering the space he devotes to the Battle of Sedan.Still, that having been said, I can strongly recommend both volumes of Barry's "The Franco-Prussian War" to any student of that war, or of 19th century warfare in general.

Military historians owe Quintin Barry a huge pint or two for giving us more than Michael Howard did in his Franco-Prussian War history. The details can be overwhelming; for the reader who seeks battles and vivid conflict, you have to pick and chose your chapters. Barry's two volumes can be as relentless as the Prussian invasion itself. Nonetheless I am gratified to find excellent analysis of most if not all of the major and minor battles of this neglected conflict. My other complaint is directed at the sloppy maps, which are very poor quality. The tiny scale and black-and-white icons make it almost impossible to discern between French and German units. Of course, Howard's maps were just as bad! If only we had maps in color with recognizable markings - - - I guess we'll have to wait for those. Nonetheless, thank you Mr. Barry!

Thouroughly related. One can easily imagine the different phases of the war, its development and aftermath. I look forward for the reading of the second volume.

Fine scholarship if a little slanted towards the German side of things, but the maps, as with most ebooks , are virtually unreadable.

The Franco-Prussian war affected the course of future world history immensely, yet outside Germany and France it seems to be one of those subjects which some may have heard of but which most know very little of. When I studied history at school it was part of the syllabus but it was treated in a very superficial way and essentially only included because something on it was necessary in support of the primary focus of our learning which was the diplomacy of Bismarck.The version we were taught was that France was goaded into a war by Bismarck (the Spanish candidature being exploited as the mechanism needed to push the right buttons in France), the French army surrendered at Sedan and Metz, the Empire fell to be replaced by another republic, there was a commune in Paris, the war ended with France losing Alsace and Lorraine and paying war reparations. This was all very light and some aspects were rather questionable. This book along with volume 2 (and I’d recommend the authors other works on the wars of von Moltke/Bismarck) is an excellent way for people to learn more about this hugely important war, being very readable and finding a good balance between analysis of strategy and stories of battlefields. Even the name Franco – Prussian war is a misnomer as the Prussian army took the field with allied German armies, particularly the Bavarian army and troops from Wurttemberg who fought with great distinction.The character which looms large throughout the book is Helmuth von Moltke, he generally exists in the shadows as an adjunct to Otto von Bismarck yet it takes nothing away from the genius of Bismarck to recognise that many of his achievements were facilitated by the Prussian and allied German armies directed by Moltke. If Bismarck fully deserves to be recognised as a brilliant statesman and diplomat then Moltke is equally deserving of his stature as a brilliant military leader. The combination of Bismarck and Moltke was truly formidable, these days much history downplays the significance of individuals to emphasise the bigger macro trends of history yet I think it is fair to say that without either of these two individuals the course of European and world history would have been different. Moltke shares something in common with the story of the war itself in that outside of Germany he is one of those figures which many are aware of but know very little of, something that the authors books go a long way to correcting. Moltke’s story is a fascinating one, and it is rather unfortunate that he continues to exist in the shadow of Bismarck, he basically established the template for the modern conception of chief of a military staff and how a staff should work (although I suspect he’d be rather bemused at the proliferation of staff officers after his time) and he was blessed with a remarkable grasp of strategy. His leadership of the Prussian – German armies was almost faultless, and the fact that the Prussian army functioned so effectively was largely as a result of how it had been organised and prepared in peacetime.The author differs somewhat from the version of how the war started I (and probably many others) was taught at school and places much more responsibility with France. Initially the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne was seen as a political hedgehog in Prussia and certainly Bismarck saw how it could be manipulated to further Prussian aims but Prussia did not instigate it and it was the bellicose attitude of France which escalated things into a full blown crises, overplayed their hand so disastrously and who were the ones that decided on war. That is not to say that Bismarck and Moltke were entirely innocent but although both considered a war with France to be almost inevitable at some point it does not appear that either sought it in 1870 and there is a huge gulf between seeing war as likely and actually wanting war. Certainly, after the Hohenzollern’s decided to withdraw themselves from consideration for the Spanish thrown France could have achieved a diplomatic coup if they’d avoided their attempt to capitalise on things by making unrealistic demands which were the diplomatic equivalent of trying to rub the nose of Prussia in mud. That Bismarck exploited this blunder via the Ems telegram is generally used to place Prussia as the belligerent party, ignoring the French decision to push Prussia too far and the jingoism in French circles.This first volume takes the story up to the surrender at Sedan and encirclement of Paris. Given the belligerency of France you might reasonably have expected their army to be much better prepared for a war. The speed of the initial campaign was remarkable, war commenced in mid July 1870, by mid-August the French army of the Rhine under Marshall Bazaine was besieged in Metz and the French army of Chalons along with the Emperor, under the command of Marshall McMahon then Generals Ducrot (very briefly) and de Wimpffen surrendered at Sedan on September 2nd. The period also saw the battles of Wissembourg, Spicheren, Wörth, Mars-La-Tour and Gravelotte. Within a couple of months the French imperial army had been routed and taken prisoner, the emperor made captive and Paris encircled, a remarkable military achievement to rank alongside the much more famous “blitzkrieg” legend of 1940 and a testament to Moltke’s brilliance. Especially when one of his most important subordinates, Steinmetz in command of the 1st army was anything but a good subordinate. The almost equally remarkable recovery of France under Gambetta is a story for volume 2.The story on the French side is one of inept leadership and timidity (following bellicose jingoism prior to war). The French army was well equipped (in some ways better than the Prussian – German armies with an early form of machine gun and excellent rifles, less so in others such as artillery). The contrast with the organisational professionalism and strategic thinking displayed by their opponents is striking and does beg the question of whether France lost a war or whether Prussia won the battles considered in this volume. There is an old sporting adage that a team can only beat the opponents facing them, so it is in war and if the French were woefully led then that was the enemy Moltke’s armies had to beat. The Emperor Napoleon actually comes over as a surprisingly sympathetic character, McMahon has a whiff of Hamlet, Bazaine ineffectual and Ducrot as a compotent and forceful character on the French side. Two characters whose importance cannot be underestimated for the French side in this phase of the war were the Empress Eugenie and Palikao, their influence in the events which led the Army of Chalons to Sedan can probably be best described as baleful. The Prussian – German’s made mistakes but overall their campaigns were conducted with a professionalism that was in a completely different class to that of the French army and a recurring theme throughout is the excellence of their artillery and the inspired leadership of unit commanders, who suffered high casualties, in that era Generals didn’t command from safe quarters far behind the lines, it should be said that French officers including the most senior displayed great courage on the battlefield too.The book is written in a very engaging style and is a joy to read. Very highly recommended, 5*.

Quintin Barry makes you live this war as if you were a war-reporter, so detailed are the maps that accompany the book (every single battle has its own map, and the position of every regiment is marked! ) and so well explained are the movements of the troops involved in this war between two of the most powerful european nations.In this first book it is clarified how and why the war began detailing very well all the diplomatic efforts that both nations put in effect to defend their interests and then it is described the campaign of Sedan ended with the fall of the Second Empire and of Napoleon III.The book explains the technological evolution of the weapons and the different organization of the two armies in the last years before this war, how the French Army seemed to emerge as the strongest army after the Second Italian Indepedence War on 1859 and how instead the Prussian Army through a very professional use of the artillery managed to defeat the Austrian Army on 1866 and the French Army on 1870 and on 1871.You will not find another book about this war where the mix between the smell of powder and the cold analysis of the historian is better built than on this one.

An excellent study of a crucial war between France and Prussia that served to unite the German states into one country and left France in humiliating defeat and the fall of Napoleon III. Well researched and heavily illustrated with maps and diagrams to follow the action, it is a must for the reader of modern warfare. In some ways it set the scene for the Great War to come as it gave birth to Imperial Germany under Prussian domination and it also showed the mastery of Moltke and Bismarck before little Kaiser Wilhelm took control and put the new state on a collision course for a disastrous and ruinous war. Imperial Germany at its peak, Republican France at its birth. A two volume set well worth the money.

good detail for historical reference but readable

Great

A war that can be seen as a rehearsal for the opening stages of WW1. A war that perhaps taught the wrong lessons to a generation of commanders.The book itself bothers itself only with the strategic & grand tactical matters. No trifling face of battle or what happens to the civilians stuff here.The maps are awful. They look like they were taken from 19th century lecture notes. No attempt is made to isolate what is important and what is not, no map shows movement in any way. The kindle version maps do not zoom in & so are essentially unreadable.